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Abstract
Consumers often nd it hard to make correct value comparisons between
market alternatives. Part of this "choice complexity" is the result of deliberate
obfuscation by rms. This review synthesizes a theoretical literature that ana-
lyzes the role of choice complexity in otherwise-competitive markets. I identify
two general classes of models in the literature: (1) rmsobfuscation strategy
is an independent "framing device" that a¤ects the probability with which con-
sumers make correct comparisons; (2) market alternatives are multi-attribute
objects, and obfuscation is captured by "lopsided" location in attribute space,
lowering the probability of being dominated by another market alternative.
I address the following key questions: What determines the amount of choice
complexity in market equilibrium? What is the relation between choice com-
plexity and payo¤-relevant aspects of the market outcome? What is the role of
consumer protection measures? The models surveyed in this review suggest that
equilibrium obfuscation and choice complexity increase in response to intensied
competition, mitigating the positive e¤ect of competition on consumer welfare.
However, equilibrium e¤ects can also attenuate the positive welfare e¤ects of
regulatory interventions.
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1 Introduction
Consumers in a modern economy regularly face choice tasks of great complexity. In
major industries such as insurance, healthcare, money management, retail banking or
telecommunications, individual products have elaborate descriptions, while prices are
often multi-dimensional and hard to compute. Supermarket shopping is complex for
various reasons: large variety of potential substitutes, non-linear and frequently chang-
ing prices, or incommensurable measurement units in which quantities are presented.
The complexity can be explicit - e.g., elaborate fee structures employed by retail banks,
or long service contracts loaded with impenetrable jargon. Yet often the complexity is
implicit and unstated - e.g., the reimbursement practice of an insurance company, or
patterns in the quality of service o¤ered by an expert.
Clearly, product complexity is hard to avoid in many cases - e.g., when an insur-
ance product targets a risk that results from a specic combination of contingencies.
However, there is a common intuition that part of the complexity that consumers en-
counter in markets is not intrinsic but strategic, designed by rms to take advantage
of consumersbounded rationality - specically, their limited ability to make correct
value comparisons. From this point of view, choice complexity is an impediment to
e¤ective market competition. Here is a typical quote from a regulators report:
When deciding whether to switch to another bank, consumers need clear,
readily available information that they can understand, as well as the nan-
cial capability and desire to evaluate it. Ease of comparison will be a¤ected
by the structure of current account pricing. The ease with which consumers
are able to compare current accounts is likely to a¤ect their desire to do so
and thus feed through to the competitive pressures that banks face.(OFT
(2008), p. 89)
This review synthesizes a theoretical literature that explores the extent to which
choice complexity is an endogenous response of competing prot-maximizing rms
to consumersbounded rationality. Firms may obfuscate to prevent a correct value
comparison; they may introduce excessive non-linearity into price plans in order to take
advantage of consumersbiased cost-benet calculations; etc. In all the market models
that I shall present, the underlying market environment is fundamentally simple, such
that if consumers were fully rational, equilibrium prices and product design could
be simple. Choice complexity arises in these models because of consumersbounded
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rationality. I address the following questions: What is the relation between choice
complexity and payo¤-relevant market outcomes? Do competitive forces lead rms
to simplify, or rather complicate the description of market alternatives? What is the
potential scope of consumer protection measures, e.g. regulating product disclosure or
designing default options?
The models in this review are based on explicit descriptions of what makes choice
complex and how consumers respond to choice complexity. I identify two broad mod-
eling approaches in the literature. One approach captures obfuscation as a distinct
framingstrategy that a¤ects the probability with which consumers make value com-
parisons. Another approach denes market alternatives as multi-dimensional objects:
a choice situation is complex when no market alternative dominates the others, and
obfuscation is captured by lopsidedlocation in multi-dimensional space, because this
tends to lower the probability of domination. The two modeling approaches tend to
t di¤erent scenarios, and thus complement each other. They can also be combined
(e.g., when rms use framing to manipulate the relative salience of di¤erent product
dimensions).
This review illuminates part of a eld known as Behavioral Industrial Organiza-
tion, which analyzes markets with rational rms and consumers who depart from the
standard rational-choice model. My objective is to synthesize the above two strands
into a coherent exposition, which hopefully adds value to the collection of individual
papers it is based on. In this sense, the review continues my own recent quest for
modeling frameworks that could usefully unify some of the main ideas in Behavioral
I.O. (see Spiegler (2014a)). The hope is that such frameworks have enough juiceto
whet the appetite of theorists, and that at the same time they will suggest modeling
ideas for more empirically inclined I.O. researchers.
This is not meant to be a detailed survey of behavioralmodels of market com-
petition. Also, I do not deal with models of complex pricing strategies in monopo-
listic settings (Rubinstein (1993), Piccione and Rubinstein (2003), Eliaz and Spiegler
(2006,2008), Grubb (2009), Heidhues and K½oszegi (2014)), nor with models of obfusca-
tion that are based on a rational-choice perspective (e.g., Ellison and Wolitzky (2012)
regard obfuscation as an attempt to increase the consumers marginal search cost in
an otherwise standard market model with sequential consumer search). Finally, I say
little about topics that received extensive treatment in other surveys of behavioral I.O.
- e.g., see Armstrong (2015) for a discussion of the externalities that naive and sophis-
ticated consumers exert on each other, or Grubb (2015b) for a discussion of market
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models with over-condent consumers.1
The structure of this review is as follows. I begin each section with a modeling
framework, and use it to present a sequence of special cases from the literature. Each
case illuminates an economically motivated question regarding the interplay between
choice complexity and market competition. I assume throughout that from a rational-
choice point of view, products can be ordered vertically, and there is no intrinsic product
di¤erentiation or heterogeneity in consumer preferences. For expositional convenience,
I refer to all relevant vertical dimensions as quality, but of course the models
capture pricing decisions as well. This yields a clear Bertrand rational-consumer
benchmark, such that all non-competitive aspects of market equilibrium are due to
consumersbounded rationality.
2 Modeling Framework I: Comparability Relations
In this section I present a modeling framework that regards obfuscation as an inde-
pendent framingcomponent in the rms competitive strategy, which inuences the
probability that consumers make value comparisons between market alternatives. It is
a special case of a more general framework of competitive framingdue to Spiegler
(2014a), and synthesizes ideas from Varian (1980), Carlin (2009), Eliaz and Spiegler
(2011a), Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013).
2.1 What Makes Comparison Hard?
The following example serves to introduce the modeling framework and show how it
can capture various intuitions about what makes it hard for consumers to make value
comparisons. Consider a market with two rms, who can provide any number of units
of a certain product at zero cost. Each rm simultaneously determines the price or
quality of its product. At the same time, each rm chooses a description format for
presenting the relevant quantity. The rmsselected formats determine the fraction
of consumers who are able to make a value comparison between the two rms. When
a consumer can make a comparison, he selects the rm that o¤ers the highest-value
product. When the consumer cannot make a comparison, he chooses arbitrarily (or by
default).
1Other recommended reviews of behavioral I.O. are Ellison (2006), Armstrong (2008), Huck and
Zhou (2011), K½oszegi (2014) and Grubb (2015a). For a graduate-level textbook treatment, see Spiegler
(2011).
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The following are two alternative scenarios that illustrate the possible meanings of
description formats:
Scenario I : A format is a measurement unit for denominating the relevant quantity.
For instance, it can be a unit of energy per which the e¢ ciency of an electric appliance
is dened, the unit of volume per which the price of a food product is dened, or
the time unit per which an interest rate is dened. Some consumers are unable to
convert units (because they are ignorant of the conversion rates, or because they lack
the numeracy that would enable them to perform the conversion), and therefore unable
to make a value comparison.
Scenario II: The rm chooses whether to present the content of its product using a
simple, transparent language that a layperson would understand, or an obscure technical
jargon that a non-specialist can understand only when translated into lay terms. The
translation can sometimes fail and produce gibberish, in which case the consumer will
be unable to make a value comparison.
The two scenarios di¤er in where they locate the complexity of making value com-
parisons. In Scenario I, formats do not possess intrinsic complexity; di¢ culty of com-
parison arises only when rms employ di¤erent formats. In contrast, in scenario II
formats are ranked according to their intrinsic complexity. As a result, the two scenar-
ios induce di¤erent obfuscation incentives. In scenario II, if a rm wants to encourage
(discourage) comparison - because it o¤ers a high-value (low-value) product - it will
unambiguously prefer to use transparent (obscure) language. In contrast, in scenario I
there is no unequivocal preference for either format, because what matters is whether
the rms coordinate their formats.
As we shall see later in this section, this distinction has multi-faceted implications
for the analysis of market equilibrium and regulatory interventions. Thus, the equilib-
rium interplay between competition and obfuscation crucially depends on whether we
locate choice complexity in the description format employed by the individual rm, or
in the relation between the formats employed by two rm.
2.2 General Framework
Consider a market consisting of n identical prot-maximizing rms and a single con-
sumer (equivalently, a continuum of ex-ante identical consumers). Let M be a nite
set of description formats. For now, assume the consumer has no outside option and
must choose one of the rms - we will introduce an outside option in Section 4. The
rms play a simultaneous-move game with complete information. Each rm i = 1; :::; n
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chooses a pair (qi;mi), where qi 2 [0; 1] is the quality of its product, and mi 2 M is
the format it employs to describe it. I refer to the pair (qi;mi) as the extended alter-
nativeo¤ered by rm i. The rms payo¤ conditional on being chosen is 1  qi. The
consumers true utility from a product is equal to its quality, such that total surplus
from any rm-consumer interaction is constant and equal to 1. Thus, quality is a
stand-in for the share in the interaction surplus that the rm o¤ers to the consumer.2
Let R be the set of all symmetric, non-reexive binary relations over the set
f1; :::; ng. I interpret a relation R 2 R as a comparability relation; the statement
iRj means that the consumer can compare the products o¤ered by rms i and j. The
consumers choice procedure involves two stages:
 First, there is a stochastic mapping  : Mn ! (R). Assume that  is sym-
metric, in the sense that it is neutral to permutations of (m1; :::;mn). Let
R(m1; :::;mn) denote the probability of the comparability relation R given the
prole of formats (m1; :::;mn). We will say that rm i ismaximal given (q1; :::; qn; R)
if there exists no j 6= i such that jRi and qj > qi. Note that there is always at
least one maximalrm.
 Second, the consumer chooses randomly from among the maximal rms according
to a function s, where si(q1; :::; qn; R) is the probability that rm i is chosen,
given that the quality prole is (q1; :::; qn) and the comparability relation is R. In
particular, all the models that will be examined in this section have the feature
that s(q1; :::; qn; R) is the uniform distribution over the set of maximal rms given
(q1; :::; qn; R).
The consumers choice procedure induces the following payo¤ for rm i:
(1  qi) 
X
R
R(m1; :::;mn)si(q1; :::; qn; R)
This completes the description of the game.3
The crucial feature of this modeling framework approach is that a rms choice of
quality does not restrict its set of available formats - i.e., the substance and framing of
2The notion of "true utility" is problematic from a revealed-preference point of view, because the
consumer in this model will not behave like a conventional utility maximizer. Spiegler (2011) contains
thorough discussions of this common feature of behavioral I.O. models.
3Formats are assumed here to be costless. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a,b) analyze models in which
rms take costly actions - e.g., adding irrelevant alternativesto their product line - that manipulate
consumerspropensity to make comparisons.
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a rms o¤er are independent. Thus, it cannot capture situations in which the two are
inseparable. The primitives M and  can capture various situations. For instance, to
accommodate the measurement unitsscenario of the previous sub-section, interpret
M as a set of possible measurement units. For n = 2,  describes the probability that
the consumer can convert m1 into m2 (or vice versa). A format can also represent a
languagein which alternatives are described - as in the technical jargonscenario of
the previous sub-section. In this case,  captures the di¢ culty of translating statements
made in foreignlanguages into a commonly understood, laylanguage. Finally, a
format can represent a packaging or positioning decision. For instance, the same yogurt
can be positioned as a funproduct or as a spiritualproduct. This interpretation
brings the model quite close to conventional product di¤erentiation, and the distinction
between the two emerges from the structure of s, which may be inconsistent with
random utility maximization.
The function  captures how rmschoice of formats a¤ects the complexity of con-
sumer choice, as captured by the comparability relation R. A complex choice problem
is identied with a distribution that assigns high probability to sparse comparability
relations. Rational choice is identied with the special case in which  always assigns
probability one to the complete relation (i.e., iRj for every i 6= j), such that the con-
sumer always makes value comparisons, regardless of the prole of formats. In this
case, rms play q = 1 and earn zero prots in symmetric Nash equilibrium.
This modeling approach is closely linked to the choice-theoretic literature on choices
with frames. Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), and later (more generally and systemati-
cally) Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009), enriched the
standard choice model and dened the notion of an extended choice problemthat
also species the choice problems frame. The choice function s in the present model
is a stochastic version of the choices-with-frames model, where the frame is R. The
crucial additional component is the frames endogenous determination of the frame via
rmschoice of formats.
The following property turns out to be relevant for equilibrium behavior in this
model.
Denition 1 (Enforceable Comparability) The function  satises enforceable-
comparability (EC) if there exist distributions  2 (M) and  2 (R) such that
(R) =
X
mi2M
(mi)R(mi;m i)
for every m i.
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ECmeans that an individual rm can unilaterally enforce a given distribution  over
the consumers comparability relation. Obviously, if  satises EC, the distribution 
is unique.4
The following are two benchmark cases in which EC holds trivially. First, sup-
pose there is a marketing device m that induces the complete comparability relation
with probability one, as if it can switch on a lightthat enables perfect comparisons.
The behavioral I.O. literature sometimes refers to such an action as educating the
consumer- i.e., transforming him unilaterally into a conventionally rational decision
maker. Second, suppose that  is a constant function that assigns probability  to the
complete relation and probability 1   to the empty relation, regardless of the prole
of formats. This specication reduces the framework to Varians (1980) classic model,
which assumed that an exogenous fraction of consumers make a perfect value compar-
ison across all rms and thus choose the best market alternative, while the remaining
consumers are entirely unable to make a comparison, and they choose uniformly among
all rms, regardless of the value of their products.
2.3 Equilibrium Choice Complexity in the Two-Firm Case
When n = 2, there are two possible comparability relations, the complete relation
(1R2) and the empty relation (1 /R2). This specication of the model was analyzed by
Piccione and Spiegler (2012). Abusing notation, I identify  with the probability it
assigns to the complete relation. Our assumption on s means that when the rms
products are comparable and qi > qj, the consumer chooses rm i with probability
one; and in any other case, he chooses each rm with probability 1
2
.
Recall that by assumption, (m;m0) = (m0;m) for every m;m0 2M . In addition,
assume (m;m) > 0 for every m 2 M , to capture the idea that there is a grain
of comparability when rms use the same description format. The assumption also
ensures that the marginal quality distribution induced by any equilibrium strategy has
no mass point on any q < 1. In particular, there exist no asymmetric pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. From now, we will restrict attention to symmetric mixed-strategy
Nash equilibria.
The following is the central question of this sub-section.
4Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Spiegler (2014a) refer to this property as "weighed regularity",
because when n = 2,  can be reduced to a weighted graph over M (not to be confused with the
comparability relation over f1; :::; ng in this presentation), such that EC is an extension of the notion
of a regular graph.
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Question 1: What determines choice complexity in market equilibrium?
Should we expect market competition to minimize the complexity of consumer choice,
or perhaps maximize it? To answer this question, we rst need to dene choice com-
plexity. In the context of the present model, we look for some notion of average com-
parison probability. Consider a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium strategy
 2 ([0; 1]M). The equilibrium choice complexity induced by  is dened as follows:
Cmin() = min
m2M
Z
q;m0
(m;m0)d(q;m0) (1)
What is the interpretation of this measure? Consider the point of view of rm 1,
say, when it contemplates o¤ering the monopolistic quality q1 = 0. As we observed
above, the strategy  played by rm 2 does not assign an atom to any q2 < 1, which
means in particular that it plays q2 > 0 with probability one. To maximize its market
share, rm 1 would choose a formatm that minimizes comparability, and Cmin() is the
lowest comparison probability it can attain, given that rm 2 plays . Firm 1s prot
would be 1
2
(1   Cmin()). It follows that if q = 0 is in the support of the marginal
equilibrium quality distribution, industry prots are 1   Cmin(). Thus, equilibrium
choice complexity and equilibrium industry prots are closely linked.
Analysis of symmetric Nash equilibria turns out to hinge on the notion of EC.
The meaning of EC in this model is that each rm can randomize over formats so as
to implement a constant probability of comparison that is independent of the oppo-
nents behavior. Equivalently, EC means that there exists some randomization over
formats that both min-maximizes and max-minimizes the probability of comparison.
To see why, consider an auxiliary zero-sum game, in which the payo¤ for one player
(not to be confused with any of the rms in our model) is the probability of compar-
ison. EC means that this zero-sum game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and by
the Minimax Theorem, the symmetric equilibrium strategy is both a max-minimizer
and a min-maximizer. When EC is violated, the zero-sum game has no symmetric
equilibrium: max-minimizing comparison probability requires di¤erent behavior than
min-maximizing it. In other words, a rm that seeks comparison would tend to choose
di¤erent formats than a rm that eschews comparison.
The following two examples illustrate these ideas. First, suppose that M consists
of K formats and comparability depends only on whether rms use identical formats -
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i.e.,
(m;m0) =
(
1 if m = m0
0 if m 6= m0
This specication ts well the measurement-unit interpretation. In this case,  sat-
ises EC because a rm can randomize uniformly over M and enforce a comparison
probability of 1
K
. In contrast, suppose that M is a nite set of real numbers and 
is a strictly increasing function. Thus, lower numbers represent formats with greater
intrinsic complexity. This is essentially the specication in Carlin (2009). In this
case, EC is violated because each rm can always lower comparability by choosing a
lower number. The lesson from these two examples is that EC holds when compa-
rability is a matter of coordination between the formats employed by rms; and EC
is violated when comparability is a monotone function of the formatsintrinsic com-
plexity. The measurement unit interpretation of the model will typically suggest
specications that satisfy EC, whereas the jargon interpretation will typically give
rise to specications that violate EC.
Dene C to be the min-max comparison probability induced by , namely
C = min
2(M)
max
2(M)
X
m
X
m0
(m)(m0)(m;m0)
The value C represents the lowest comparison probability that a rm trying to avoid
comparison can enforce. Firmsmax-min payo¤ in this model is 1
2
(1  C). By deni-
tion, Cmin()  C for any symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy .
Proposition 1 Let  be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, Cmin() = C
if and only if  satises EC.
Thus, when  satises EC, equilibrium choice complexity is equal to its min-max
value in any symmetric Nash equilibrium - hence, rms earn max-min payo¤s in equi-
librium. Rather than maximizing or minimizing comparison probability, competitive
forces min-maximize it in this case. In fact, Piccione and Spiegler (2012) show a
stronger result: under EC, the probability of comparison is C conditional on (almost)
any realized quality prole (q1; q2). On the other hand, when EC is violated, the
equilibrium comparison probability is strictly below C, such that rms earn prots
strictly above the max-min level. Note that when M includes a format m such that
(m;m) = 1 for every m - i.e., when rms can unilaterally educate consumers -
C = 1 and so in symmetric Nash equilibrium rms play q = 1 and earn zero prots.
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Thus, non-competitive industry prots rely on the impossibility of unilateral educa-
tionof consumers.
The broad intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. When EC is satised, each rm
can enforce the constant comparison probability C, independently of the quality it
chooses. Thus, EC implies a lower bound on the rms market share conditional on
its chosen quality, given the opponents marginal quality distribution. Since market
shares must always add up to one, this implies that the lower bound is almost always
binding, and this in turn implies that comparison probability is almost always C.
In contrast, recall that when EC is violated, a rm that seeks comparison tends to
choose di¤erent formats than a rm that eschews comparison. Near the bottom of the
quality distribution, rms generally avoid comparison. Therefore, on average rms do
not randomize over formats as if they try to maximize comparability. From the point
of view of a rm that chooses the lowest quality level, it faces an opponent that does
not go out of its way to enforce comparability, and therefore it can attain a comparison
probability below the min-max level C. (When EC holds, rms that seek comparison
can behave just like rms that try to avoid it. Therefore, the fact that rms near
the bottom of the quality distribution try to avoid comparison does not contradict the
possibility that on average rms behave as if they max-minimize the probability of
comparison.)
Proposition 1 has implications for the two paradigmatic scenarios of Section 2.1. In
the measurement unitscase - i.e., when comparability is purely a matter of coordina-
tion between the rmsformats - equilibrium choice complexity is equal to the min-max
level, and therefore rms earn their max-min payo¤s. In contrast, when comparability
depends on formatsintrinsic complexity, equilibrium comparison probability is below
the min-max level, and therefore rms earn prots above their max-min level.
2.4 The Many-Firm Case
Limited comparability is a force that constrains market competition, partly because
rms endogenous format choices exacerbate the limited-comparability problem. A
conventional way to strengthen market competition is to increase the number of com-
petitors. This raises the following question.
Question 2: How does increasing the number of market competitors a¤ect
choice complexity?
The case of n > 2 introduces additional degrees of freedom, because the set of
possible comparability relations grows quickly with n. I will examine two examples from
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the literature, translated into our modeling framework. Carlin (2009) studies perhaps
the simplest extension of the two-rm case. Suppose that  assigns positive probability
only to the complete relation (iRj for all i 6= j) and the empty relation (i /Rj for all
i 6= j). This specication implies that an individual rms obfuscation decision can
a¤ect the mutual comparability of two other rms. In contrast, Chioveanu and Zhou
(2013) adopt a specication that satises an independence property: the probability
that iRj is purely a function of (mi;mj). Both Carlin (2009) and Chioveanu and
Zhou (2013) assume further that formats can be ordered unambiguously according to
their intrinsic complexity, such that when a rm chooses a more complex format, it
lowers the probability it is comparable to any other rm. Both papers reach the same
conclusion: as n ! 1, the symmetric-equilibrium probability that rms use the most
complex format converges to one.
What is the intuition behind this nding? The underlying Bertrand market
structure means that rms play a winner-take-all game. If a rm knew for sure that it
does not o¤er the highest-quality product in the market, it would want to obfuscate as
much as possible, in order to reduce the chances that the consumer will make a value
comparison. When there are many competitors playing a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium, any individual rm is unlikely to o¤er the highest-quality alternative in the
market, unless it chooses to be at the very top of the quality distribution. Therefore,
it will almost always resort to a maximally complex format. Ironically, it is precisely
the intense competitiveness of the market environment that raises the equilibrium
complexity of consumer choice to its utmost level.
The implications of this maximal-complexity result for industry prots seem to be
more model-specic. In Carlin (2009), industry prots converge to zero when n!1,
whereas in Chioveanu and Zhou (2013), they converge to a number that is bounded
away from zero; moreover, equilibrium industry prots need not decrease monotonically
with n.
The specications of  discussed in this sub-section violate EC. When EC is satis-
ed, there is always a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each rm plays the format
strategy  that unilaterally enforces the distribution  over R - independently of the
number of rms n. In this case, rmsframing behavior in equilibrium is unrespon-
sive to n. Once again, we see that key equilibrium properties rely on whether the
comparability structure satises EC.
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2.5 Consumer Protection: Harmonizing Formats
The previous discussion suggested that a mere rise in the number of competitors may
increase the equilibrium complexity of consumer choice, which e¤ectively softens mar-
ket competition and weakens its benecial e¤ect on consumer welfare. This raises the
following question:
Question 3: Can consumer protection measures reduce equilibrium choice
complexity and improve consumer welfare?
To illustrate how the framework can address this question, I focus on the two-rm
case and examine one type of intervention: regulating product description by harmo-
nizing formats(another regulatory intervention, known as default architecture, will
be discussed in Section 4). The material in this sub-section is based on Piccione and
Spiegler (2012).
Regulators often attempt to improve comparability by ghting the multitude of
description formats and collapsing them into one standardized format. Clearly, if
the regulator could enforce a switch into a regime in which M consists of a single
format m such that (m;m) = 1, it could enforce perfect comparability and our
consumer would act like the conventionally rational consumer in Bertrand competition.
A more interesting question is whether partial moves in the general direction of format
harmonization monotonically reduce equilibrium choice complexity and raise consumer
welfare. Suppose that (m;m) = 1 for every m 2 M . Let M  M be a subset of
formats containing at least two elements, such that for every distinct m;m0 2 M,
we have (m;m0) < 1 and (m;m00) = (m0;m00) for all m00 =2 M. Now consider a
switch to another function ^, which di¤ers from  only by setting ^(m;m0) = 1 for
every m;m0 2M. It is as if we collapsed M into a single format. The switch from 
to ^ clearly improves comparability. The question is whether it necessarily decreases
equilibrium choice complexity, as dened by (1), in some symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The answer, once again, turns out to depend on the concept of EC. The denition of
min-maximization has two immediate implications: (i) C^  C; (ii) equilibrium choice
complexity under  is weakly below C. Now, if ^ satises EC, then by Proposition 1,
equilibrium choice complexity under ^ is exactly C^. This means that the switch from
 to ^ leads to lower equilibrium choice complexity, hence lower equilibrium industry
prots. This is consistent with the intuition that improved comparability resulting
from format harmonization leads to a more competitive market outcome.
However, this monotonicity need not hold when ^ violates EC. Indeed, Piccione
and Spiegler (2012) show how the switch from  to ^ can leave C unchanged and at
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the same time increase equilibrium choice complexity. Suppose that M consists of two
large classes of formats, M1 and M2, such that (mi;mj) = qij for every mi 2 M i,
mj 2M j (where i and j are possibly identical). Let 1 > q11 > q12 > q22. Now suppose
that ^ di¤ers from  only in that ^(m;m0) = 1 for every m;m0 2M1. In this example,
neither  nor ^ satisfy EC, because formats can be unambiguously ordered in terms of
their comparability. Formats in M1 attain higher comparability than formats in M2
- i.e., they are intrinsically simpler. Furthermore, C^ = C

 = q12 (the assumption
that bothM1 andM2 are large plays a role in this observation). And yet, Piccione and
Spiegler (2012) show that in the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, choice complexity
and industry prots go up.
The intuition is as follows. In equilibrium, there will be a cuto¤ q, such that when
a rm chooses a quality level above (below) q, it will adopt formats in M1 (M2) in
order to maximize (minimize) comparability. As a result of the switch from  to ^,
when a rm considers o¤ering a quality level slightly above q and using a format in
M1, it is now more worried about the prospect of facing an opponent who o¤ers a
higher quality level, since comparability within M1 has gone up. At the same time,
the switch from  to ^ does not change comparability within M2, or between M1 and
M2. Therefore, the rm will prefer to switch to the complexformats in M2. In the
new equilibrium, this shift translates to a higher probability that rms use M2, which
means that equilibrium choice complexity is higher than prior to the intervention. In
other words, the regulators harmonization of formats that were relatively simple to
begin with has an adverse equilibrium e¤ect on consumer welfare. The lesson from this
exercise is that a partial move toward format harmonization can be counterproductive,
if rms can use more complex formats that are not subjected to the harmonization.
2.6 Summary
This section presented a modeling framework that captures choice complexity by a
comparability relation over rms. This relation is endogenously determined by the
rmsequilibrium choice of description formats, via the primitive function . We
saw how this formalism can be employed to analyze three key questions: What is
the equilibrium choice complexity that results from market competition? How does
it change with the number of competitors? What is the e¤ect of other regulatory in-
terventions? In each case, the notion of enforceable comparability (EC) was crucial
for the analysis. In particular, it meant that the analysis is sensitive to whether we
conceive of the comparability problem as a matter of format coordination among
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rms (where EC holds), or as a monotone function of the individual formatsintrinsic
complexity(where EC is violated). In the latter case, rms respond to competitive
pressures by obfuscating. As a result, interventions that might seem a priori to foster
competition (increasing the number of competitors, harmonizing description formats
to improve comparability) end up exacerbating equilibrium choice complexity and pos-
sibly harming consumer welfare. In contrast, when EC holds, equilibrium behavior is
more well-behavedw.r.t these interventions, because equilibrium choice complexity
can be invariant to them.
A rational-choice approach to endogenous comparability
The point of view throughout this review is that rms have all the initiative in de-
termining choice complexity, whereas consumers are passive in this regard. A more
conventional approach would assume that consumersability to make comparisons is
a consequence of an earlier information-acquisition decision made by consumers them-
selves. Fershtman and Fishman (1994) and Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) imple-
mented this approach in the context of Varians (1980) model. Take the basic Varian
model as described earlier in this section, and adopt the interpretation that there is a
continuum of ex-ante identical consumers. Now assume that consumers start out with
the empty comparability relation, and each individual consumer can choose (simulta-
neously with the choices made by all other market agents) to switch to the complete
relation at a cost. In equilibrium, the consumers choice is individually rational.
In this environment, if all consumers chose to incur the cost, the equilibrium out-
come would be competitive with no quality dispersion, and so investing the cost could
not be individually rational for consumers. Therefore, the competitive outcome cannot
be sustained in equilibrium. At the other extreme, there is a Diamond Paradoxequi-
librium in which no consumer incurs the cost and rms act monopolistically. However,
there is also a mixedequilibrium in which a fraction of the consumer population in-
curs the cost. This equilibrium exhibits interesting features. For instance, introducing
a minimum quality standard articially shrinks the dispersion of quality in the market,
and thereby reduce the consumersincentive to incur the cost, such that in equilibrium
fewer of them are able to make a quality comparison. As a result, if the minimum
standard is relatively low, consumers can be worse o¤. This e¤ect is in the same half
measures are worse than no measuresspirit of Section 2.3.
De Clippel, Eliaz and Rozen (2014) analyze a model in which consumers participate
in m markets. Each of these markets consists of two rms, a leader and a challenger,
who simultaneously choose prices. The consumer observes the prices set by all leaders,
but he can only observe some xed number k of challengers - that is, there is an
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exogenous constraint on the total amount of attention he can devote to his multi-market
environment. Di¤erent consumers have di¤erent values of k. In market equilibrium,
rms in each market e¤ectively play a complex, asymmetric two-rm Varian game, in
which the fraction of consumers who make a comparison in the market is given by their
attention-allocation decision (conditional on the leadersprices). As in Fershtman and
Fishman (1994) and Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), the model of de Clippel et
al. (2014) exhibits non-trivial comparative statics. In particular, an upward shift in
the distribution of k can lead to higher equilibrium prices. The reason is that when
consumers are partially attentive, leaders have an incentive not to stand out as being
too expensive because that would lead the consumer to inspect the challenger, who
tends to be cheaper. The incentive not to stand out decreases with consumers
attention span, and this in turn softens competition.
The models in this tradition invariably assume that consumers have rational expec-
tations - they fully understand the equilibrium market regularities when choosing their
comparability relation. In contrast, the consumers elsewhere in this section are passive,
and display no understanding of the equilibrium relation between the formats rms em-
ploy and the quality of their products. Constructing models in which both rms and
consumers make decisions that a¤ect the comparability relation, where consumers have
a partial understanding of equilibrium regularities, is an important challenge for future
research.
3 Modeling Framework II: Multi-Attribute Prod-
ucts
The modeling framework in Section 2 treated the quality of a rms product and its
description format as two distinct variables, which in principle can be chosen indepen-
dently. There are situations in which this separation does not make sense. For instance,
unusual design of a can of soup can have functional, payo¤-relevant implications; but
at the same time, it attracts the consumers attention away from competing brands,
and in this sense it is part of the products framing. In this case, substance and
framing are inseparable.5
In this section I take a modeling approach that embraces the inseparability of
substance and framing. This approach is based on a strand in the literature, going
back to Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Spiegler (2006), which views alternatives as
5Spiegler (2014a) shows how to adapt the formalism of Section 2, and the notion of EC, to accom-
modate interdependence between these two components of the rms strategy.
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elements in RK , K  2. Alternatives can be multi-attribute objects (such that each
dimension corresponds to a di¤erent attribute), contingent contracts (such that each
component of the vector describes an outcome in a di¤erent contingency), or pricing
strategies by multi-product rms. A rms pure strategy consists of a location in RK .
As in Section 2, the market consists of n identical prot-maximizing rms and a
single consumer. Firms play a simultaneous-move game with complete information.
Each rm i = 1; :::; n chooses a vector qi 2 [0;1)K , where qki is the products quality
along dimension k. The products true qualityis dened as its simple average along
dimensions, qi = (kqki )=K. The rms payo¤ conditional on being chosen is 1   qi.
The consumers true utility from a product is equal to its true quality. As before,
quality is a convenient stand-in for any verticaldimension, including prices. As
before, assume the consumer has no outside option and must choose one of the rms.6
In this framework, relaxing consumer rationality means that the consumer employs
a di¤erent method for aggregating the various dimensions. For example, he may con-
tinue to maximize an additively separable utility function, albeit with wrongweights;
or he may neglect dimensions in which all alternatives have similar quality (as in Ru-
binstein (1988)). Most reasonable aggregation rules would have the property that when
one market alternative strictly dominates all others, the consumer will choose it. In-
deed, that would be a simple choice. Accordingly, in this section a choice problem is
complex when there is no dominant market alternative.
In the models I examine in this section, I will assume that the consumer focuses on
a (possibly random) single dimension, and chooses the rm that performs best along
that dimension (with symmetric tie breaking). There can be various reasons for such
selective attention. First, consumers may simply fail to notice or think about some
relevant product attributes. This is the case when certain attributes are less salient
than others (e.g., add-ons and fees that materialize long after they sign the contract).
Second, the task of aggregating all dimensions is demanding computationally, and sam-
pling a small subset of attributes is a simplifying heuristic. Finally, trading o¤ various
considerations against each other may be emotionally di¢ cult. For instance, how does
one justify the trade-o¤ between product safety and price? Or, when comparing retire-
ment plans, how does one trade o¤ ones own disability benets and their beneciaries
pension? People may wish to avoid making these emotionally hard choices, by con-
veniently forgettingabout some of the relevant attributes. (Choosing by default is
6Under the multi-product-rm interpretation, each alternative qi represents a bundle ofK products,
such that qki is the quality of product k. This interpretation carries the implicit assumption that the
bundles cannot be disentangled - e.g., consumers cannot split their shopping into several supermarkets.
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another way to lower this emotional cost- see Section 4.)
Obfuscation in this model can be captured by lopsided location in RK , which
tends to lower the probability of domination: if alternatives were all located on a single
ray from the origin, every pair of distinct alternatives would dominate one another
and the consumers choice problem would be simple. Specically, we will measure
obfuscation by the gap between the quality the consumer perceives in the dimension
he considers and the true quality that rms o¤er. Since this gap can be random, we
will be interested in both its mean and its variance - the larger they are, the greater
the obfuscation. When true quality falls below what consumers perceive at the time
they make their choice, they may end up feeling ripped o¤, even if the absolute quality
they experience is high.7
3.1 Two Firms, Two Dimensions
Let us begin with the simplest possible environment, where n = K = 2, and assume
that the consumer focuses his attention on dimension 1 (2) with probability  (1 ).
W.l.o.g, assume   1
2
. The interpretation is that the consumer is more likely to sample
dimension 1 because it is more salient. This is a slight variation on a model due to
Bachi and Spiegler (2015), which has the same equilibrium characterization. When
 = 1, we have a degenerate case of Gabaix and Laibson (2006), where dimension 2 is
a shrouded attributebecause consumers entirely fail to consider it at the time they
choose between the two rms.
Question 4: How are true quality and its distribution across dimensions
determined in equilibrium?
The following result characterizes symmetric Nash equilibrium. For brevity, I omit
the complete description of the equilibrium, and focus on its essential features.
Proposition 2 (Bachi and Spiegler (2015)) There is a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium. Each rm earns (1   ) in equilibrium. When  = 1, rms play the
pure strategy (q1; q2) = (2; 0). When  2 [1
2
; 1), rms play a mixed strategy, such
that true quality is distributed over the interval [1   ; ]. The support of the equilib-
rium mixed strategy consists of all points (q1; q2) along the straight line that connects
(0; 2(1  )) and (2; 0).
7From a revealed-preference point of view, choosing according to a random attribute is consistent
with random-utility maximization. However, extensions of the model that involve an outside option
will sever this equivalence - see Section 4.
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Thus, when  = 1, the equilibrium strategy is competitive in the sense that true
quality is the same as it would be with rational consumers. At the same time, ob-
fuscation is maximal, as the gap between the quality that the consumer perceives
in the dimension he focuses on and the true quality of the product he consumes is
2  1
2
(2 + 0) = 1. This is the highest possible gap subject to the constraint that rms
earn non-negative prots.
In contrast, when  = 1
2
- i.e., when both dimensions are equally salient and
therefore equally likely to be considered by the consumer - the equilibrium strategy is
non-competitive, in the sense that true quality is below 1. Obfuscation is weaker, in
the sense that the gap between perceived and true quality is randomly distributed over
[ 1
2
; 1
2
].
In general, as  goes down toward 1
2
, the expected true quality that rms o¤er in
equilibrium decreases, while the distribution of quality between dimensions becomes
more balanced. Thus, competitiveness and obfuscation are positively correlated. Note
that for every  < 1, the support of the equilibrium strategy is a downward-sloping line.
Thus, market alternatives never dominate one another in equilibrium, which means
that the consumer never faces a simple choice. In this sense, market competition
maximizes choice complexity.
3.2 Many Firms, Many Dimensions
Let us now examine the case of an arbitrary number of rms n, and consider theK !1
limit. In addition, suppose that the dimension the consumer focuses on is entirely
unpredictable. In such an environment, it makes sense to restrict attention to equilibria
in which each rm i randomizes independently over every dimension according to the
same distribution. The model is then reduced to the following game, which was studied
by Spiegler (2006). Each rm i simultaneously chooses a cdf Fi over [0;1); the
consumer draws a random sample point qi from each Fi, and selects the highest-quality
rm in his sample (with symmetric tie-breaking). The true quality of the product
o¤ered by rm i is qi = EFi(q) - i.e., expected quality according to Fi.
This reduced-form model trivializes some aspects of choice complexity and obfus-
cation. First, the notion of choice complexity as the probability that one market
alternative dominates all others becomes irrelevant. Second, by denition, the con-
sumers sample provides unbiased estimates of the market alternativestrue quality.
Hence, the expected gap between true and perceived quality is always zero. We will
therefore evaluate obfuscation in terms of the gap between true and perceived quality
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in absolute terms, e.g. as measured by the variance of quality cdf s.
Firm is prot conditional on being chosen is 1   EFi(q). The consumer chooses
rm i with the probability that its quality is the highest in a random sample from
(F1; :::; Fn), with symmetric tie-breaking. When all rms happen to play continuous
cdfs, rm is payo¤ can be conveniently written as
1 
Z 1
0
qdFi(q)


Z 1
0
 Y
j 6=i
Fj(q)
!
dFi(q)
However, the model does not impose the a-priori requirement that rms play continuous
cdf s.
Proposition 3 (Spiegler (2006)) There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Each rm plays the cdf
F (q) = n 1
r
2q
n
over the interval [0; n
2
].
The symmetric equilibrium has several interesting features. Regardless of n, true
quality under F  is 1
2
. Thus, ercer competition fails to improve true quality. Instead,
F  undergoes a mean-preserving spread when n increases, such that the consumers
perceived quality (via sampling) becomes a noisier (unbiased) estimate of true quality.
As in the framework of Section 2, the lesson is that stronger competition intensies
obfuscation (suitably dened).
A key step in the proof of Proposition 3 also claries the structure of F : in
equilibrium, each rm faces a linear residual demand - that is, the rms market share
conditional on o¤ering any q  n
2
is proportional to q. The reason is that if the residual
demand were not linear, the rm could deviate to a distribution with the same mean
and attain a larger market share, by shifting weight toward the extremes (middle) of
intervals in which demand is convex (concave).
When n > 2, F  assigns positive probability to q > 1 - i.e. loss-making quality
levels. This is similar to the bait-and-switch e¤ect we observed in the two-rm, two-
dimension case: high quality realizations are the bait that attracts consumers, whereas
low realizations generate prots from customers lured by the bait. The di¤erence is
that both the bait and the switch are drawn independently from the same distribution
F . In equilibrium, consumers end up feeling exploited, in the sense that the perceived
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quality of the selected rm is on average higher than its true quality. Moreover, this
gap increases when n goes up - the reason is that true quality is 1
2
for all rms and
all n, whereas the perceived quality of the selected rm is distributed according to
the rst-order statistic of n sample points from F . This statistic increases with n for
two reasons: rst, for any xed distribution, it increases with the number of sample
points; and second, the distribution itself undergoes a mean-preserving spread when n
goes up. Thus, the consumerssubjective sense of exploitation increases as competition
intensies.
An attractive outside option
An intuitive method for encouraging competitive behavior is to introduce an outside
option. Spiegler (2012) extends the many-rm, many-dimension model in this direction.
Suppose that consumers have an outside option of quality q0 > 0. The consumer
continues to choose the alternative with the highest quality in his sample (which now
includes the outside option). If the quality of all market alternatives in his sample
is below q0, the consumer will choose the outside option. It turns out rms respond
to this change in their environment in much the same way that they respond to an
increase in the number of competitors. The equilibrium quality distribution that rms
o¤er continues to have a mean of 1
2
, and it undergoes a mean-preserving spread relative
to the case of q0 = 0.
This extension gives rise to a novel feature. When q0 > 0, there is no reason for
rms to assign weight to (0; q0). Therefore, the equilibrium cdf assigns an atom to
q = 0, and a smooth density to the interval (q0; q), where both the size of the atom
on q = 0 and the value of q increase with n. When we interpret outcomes as prices
rather than quality, q = 0 corresponds to a monopoly priceand q > q0 correspond to
sales prices. This is suggestive of a feature that has been observed in retail markets:
recurrent regular prices and uctuating sales prices.8
3.3 Educating Consumers
Unlike the modeling framework of Section 2, the multi-attribute model does not have
a rich enough language for expressing the possibility of educatingthe consumer, and
we need to augment the model in order to accommodate it. Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
examine what happens when rms can unilaterally alert consumers to the shrouded
8Heidhues and K½oszegi (2014) survey the relevant empirical literature, and present a di¤erent
model that generates a similar pattern: a monopolistic rm faces consumers who are loss averse, in
the sense that their willingness to pay increases if they expect to buy, and decreases if the realized
price is higher than the price they expected to pay.
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attribute, and assume that in this case all consumers choose the product that o¤ers the
highest true utility. This does not mean that rms will exercise this option. When the
ability to unshroudattribute 2 is incorporated into the basic model with n = K = 2
and  = 1, there is an equilibrium in which rms play (q0; q1) = (2; 0) and refrain
from educating consumers. The reason is that if a rm deviates from this strategy and
unshrouds attribute 2, it cannot attract consumers and earn a positive prot at the
same time.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) adopt the interpretation that dimensions 1 and 2 rep-
resent the prices of a basic product and an add-on, respectively (one rms add-on is
incompatible with the other rms basic product). They extend the model by assuming
the availability of an exogenous, cheap substitute for the add-on. They also allow for
the coexistence of attentive consumers who are aware of both dimensions and inat-
tentive consumers who neglect the add-on. In equilibrium, rms charge a price below
marginal cost for the basic product and a monopoly price for the add-on. Attentive
consumers switch to the exogenous substitute after buying the basic product. As a
result, rms have no incentive to educate inattentive consumers.
Heidhues, K½oszegi and Murooka (2016) draw interesting implications from the pos-
sibility of education-free equilibrium in the Gabaix-Laibson model. They assume a
oor on the price of the basic product (in the qualitylanguage of this review, they
e¤ectively impose a ceiling on q2 which is strictly below 2). This prevents the equilib-
rium outcome in the basic model with n = K = 2 and  = 1 from being competitive
in the zero-prot sense, which means that an individual rm may have a strict prefer-
ence not to educate inattentive consumers. The reason is that an educated consumer
will revise his evaluation of the market alternatives downward, and possibly nd the
true price that the rm charges too high. Now, suppose that there is an ex-ante stage
in which one of the rms can invent new add-ons and hidden fees. Heidhues et al.
(2016) refer to this as exploitative innovation. They show that if the innovation
can be easily copied by competitors, this ensures the existence of an education-free
equilibrium in the continuation price- or quality-setting game. In contrast, when the
innovation cannot be easily copied, the rival rms incentive not to educate consumers
in the continuation game breaks down, which destroys the incentive for exploitative
innovation. This simple model links two aspects of equilibrium choice complexity: the
existence of spurious attributes and the rmsincentive to shroud them.
Comment: Does education imply rational behavior?
Our analysis of educating consumers presumed that when a rm calls the consumers
attention to the hidden attribute 2, he automatically turns into a conventionally ra-
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tional decision maker who correctly aggregates the two dimensions. Spiegler (2014b)
argues that this conclusion is questionable, due to the deep psychological factors that
underlie the observed failure to perform trade-o¤s. Even when the consumer is aware
of both dimensions, he may nd it convenient to ignore one of them. However, the
intervention may cause him to treat the attributes more symmetrically - i.e.,  will
decrease toward 1
2
. In other words, educating the consumer will not raise his atten-
tion budget, but merely reallocate it across dimensions. As we saw, this leads to a
less competitive equilibrium outcome. The lesson is that we need to be careful not to
identify the act of drawing consumersawareness to shrouded attributes with the act
of eliminating the bounded-rationality element in their decision process.
3.4 Summary
The multi-attribute framework illuminates the relation between choice complexity and
market competition from a di¤erent angle. The lessons are broadly similar to those
obtained in the framework of Section 2, but the details are of course di¤erent. Once
again, we saw that market competition is a force that may exacerbate choice complexity.
In the two-rm, two-dimension case, equilibrium choice complexity - dened in terms
of the frequency with which one market alternative dominates the other - is maximized
by market competition. In the many-rm, many-dimension case, adding rms increases
the variance of the quality distribution they play. In both models, obfuscation takes the
form of bait-and-switch tactics, broadly dened. Consumers end up feeling exploited,
because the true quality of their chosen product is on average below its perceived
quality at the time of choice. The relation between competitiveness of the equilibrium
outcome and the amount of obfuscation is subtle. In the two-rm, two-dimension case,
the two are positively related (as we modify the parameter that measures the relative
salience of the two dimensions). In the many-rm, many-dimension case, obfuscation
increases with n, while the competitiveness of the market outcome remains constant.
The Gabaix-Laibson model is the simplest specimen of the multi-attribute frame-
work. Partly for that reason, it has been applied extensively. We have seen how
Heidhues et al. (2016) used it as a platform for studying exploitative innovation.
Likewise, Armstrong and Vickers (2012) used it as a basis for modeling retail banks
use of contingent charges (such as overdraft fees). More complex specications that
involve arbitrary n andK - as well as more general methods for aggregating the ordinal
quality rankings along the dimensions - remain largely unexplored. Majority auctions,
studied by Szentes and Rosenthals 2003(a,b), can be reinterpreted as an example of
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such a model. Characterizing equilibria in this more general class of models is an
important challenge for future research.
4 An Application: Default Architecture
When consumers face choice problems that are cognitively or emotionally demanding,
a natural response for them is to eschew making an explicit choice. This means that
when there is an available default option, consumers will have an increased tendency
to choose it when facing a complex choice problem. This idea has some experimental
and empirical support (Iyengar Huberman and Jiang (2004), Madrian and Shea (2001),
Beshears et al. (2012)). However, the models examined in Sections 2 and 3 did not
include an explicit default option, and in particular assumed that consumers have no
outside option. In this section I enrich the analysis in this direction.
This enrichment enables us to explore theoretically one of the most inuential
policy ideas that have come out of behavioral economics, namely the design of default
options, often referred to as default architecture(see Thaler and Sunstein (2008)).
By changing the specication of the default option, a regulator can exploit decision
makersdefault bias to increase participation rates in programs like organ donation or
retirement saving. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) acknowledged that default bias is not a
primitive phenomenon and that it originates from more fundamental forces, including
choice complexity. Bachi and Spiegler (2015) and Spiegler (2014b) integrate these
considerations explicitly into an equilibrium analysis of default architecture. To avoid
unnecessary tedium, the following discussion is exclusively based on the latter, which
makes use of the modeling framework of Section 2. I refer the reader to Bachi and
Spiegler (2015) for an equilibrium analysis of default architecture that is based on the
model of Section 3.1.
Consider the two-rm case analyzed in Section 2.1, and now assume that the con-
sumer has an outside option that gives him a net payo¤ of 0. This is an extreme
assumption, which means that opting out of the market is always the wrong action for
the consumer (except when both rms o¤er q = 0, in which case there is a tie). In
addition, assume that when there is an explicit default option and the consumer is un-
able to make a value comparison between the two market alternatives, he chooses the
default option (whatever it is) with probability , and each of the two rms with proba-
bility 1
2
(1 ). When there is no designated default option, the consumer is simply not
allowed to choose by default and must make an active choice, in which case he chooses
each rm with probability 1
2
. The parameter  thus captures the consumers potential
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default bias. A higher value of  represents a consumer who is temperamentally less
decisive, or more averse to making arbitrary selections that he cannot justify.
The literature on default architecture distinguishes among the following rules:
Opting in. The default is the outside option.
Opting out. The default is one of the rms (to maintain the models symmetry, I will
assume that both rms are equally likely to play this role).
Active choice. The consumer cannot choose by default.
Given the models symmetries and the assumption that the outside option is always
inferior to the market alternatives, active choice and opting out are payo¤-equivalent
as far as the rms are concern. Therefore, I will only compare opting in and opting
out.9
Note that under opting in, the consumer can make manifestly sub-optimal choices.
He may realize that the outside option is his worst choice, but since he cannot com-
pare the two market alternatives and has an aversion to making arbitrary decisions, he
may procrastinate and end up with the inferior outside option. In this case the con-
sumer acts like the proverbial Buridans Ass: unable to choose between two attractive
alternatives, he ends up with a third inferior one only because it is the default.
The extended model broadly ts markets for long-term services (insurance, maga-
zine subscription, mobile phone services). In this context, opting inmay correspond
to a regulatory intervention that rules out automatic contract renewals, whereas opt-
ing outts an environment in which auto-renewals are the norm. It should be em-
phasized that a lot of the discussion of default architecture in the literature does not
involve competitive consumer markets. Clearly, non-market activities such as organ
donation are entirely outside the models scope. Things are more subtle when it comes
to the design of dened-contribution retirement saving programs in the US. In reality,
saving funds do not compete directly for savers - the interaction is mediated by the
saversemployers, who shape the set of feasible alternatives and its presentation, and
negotiate the management fees with the funds. This is a de-facto-regulated market,
where the employer plays the role of a regulator. In this context, our analysis can
be viewed as speculation about the equilibrium e¤ects of default architecture if this
de-facto regulation were lifted.
9One could argue that forcing consumers to make arbitrary selections makes them incur a psycho-
logical cost that choosing by default would save. From this point of view, opting out and active choice
are not equivalent for consumer welfare.
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What is the e¤ect of default architecture on equilibrium choice complexity and
consumer welfare? Once again, EC turns out to be a crucial property. Recall that
EC means that each rm can randomize over formats according to some  2 (M),
such that comparison probability is C. Thus, whatever the default rule, there is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each rm randomizes over formats according to
, independently of its mixture over q. This means that equilibrium choice complexity
is potentially invariant to the default rule. (This is a weak statement because I do not
know whether symmetric equilibrium is generally unique under opting in.)
Of course, the rmsequilibrium mixture over quality will not be invariant to the
default rule. Under opting in, the consumer adheres to the outside option with
probability  when he is unable to make a comparison. In contrast, under opting
outhe always chooses one of the rms. Thus, market participation rates are higher
under opting out. But at the same time, rmsbenet from lack of comparability
is lower under opting in(and it vanishes completely when  = 1); and as a result,
the equilibrium quality distribution is higher under opting in. When calculating
equilibrium consumer welfare, the two e¤ects cancel each other out! To see why, let
C < 1 and consider the point of view of a rm that o¤ers q = 0 (which is in the support
of the equilibrium quality distribution under both default rules).10 Under opting in,
the rms equilibrium prot from this quality choice is
(1  C)  (1  )  1
2
In contrast, under opting out, the rms equilibrium prot from this quality choice
is
(1  C)  1
2
Net consumer welfare in equilibrium is equal to the market participation rate minus
industry prots. This gives us
(C + 1  )  2  (1  C)  (1  )  1
2
= C
under opting in, whereas opting outgives us
1  2  (1  C)  1
2
= C
Thus, when choice complexity is invariant to the default rule, so is consumer welfare.
10When C = 1, the equilibrium outcome is competitive with full market participation, indepen-
dently of the default rule.
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When EC is violated, equilibrium choice complexity - and therefore net consumer
welfare - may be sensitive to the default rule. Take the special case in which formats
can be ordered unambiguously in terms of their e¤ect on comparison probability - i.e.,
in terms of their intrinsic complexity. Under opting out, rms benet from the
consumers default bias and therefore have some incentive to complicate his choice
problem. In contrast, under opting in, rms do not benet from default bias, and
therefore have a weaker incentive to increase choice complexity. When  ! 1 - i.e.
when the consumers potential default bias is extreme - rms will choose the simplest
format in equilibrium under opting in. This has several interesting e¤ects. First,
equilibrium choice complexity will be as low as possible given the function , and as a
result, the consumer will exhibit high participation rates and little observed default bias
in equilibrium. This is supercially paradoxical: observed default bias is at its lowest
precisely when the potential for default bias is at its highest. The resolution of the
apparent paradox is that under opting in, rms do not benet from default bias and
therefore refrain from obfuscation, which leads to low choice complexity and therefore
low observed default bias. As far as net consumer welfare is concerned, opting in
may be superior to opting out.
Let us discuss these e¤ects in terms of the real-life examples of default architec-
ture discussed above. First, consider the interpretation of defaults rules in terms of
automatic renewal of long-term services. The equilibrium analysis provides qualied
support for the intuition that in these environments, banning auto-renewals leads to
higher consumer welfare. When EC does not hold and formats can be ordered un-
ambiguously in terms of their intrinsic complexity, rms respond to the ban on auto-
renewals by obfuscating less, and this can have a benecial e¤ect on consumer welfare
that outweighs the bans direct negative e¤ect on market participation rates. As to
retirement saving, the analysis highlights the importance of the employers active role
as a de-facto regulator of the interaction between funds and savers. In its absence,
the switch from opting into opting outmight incentivize funds to obfuscate and
raise management fees. Savers benet not only from the soft paternalismof default
architecture, but also from the employers hard paternalism (to the extent that it
can be trusted to serve the saversinterests).
5 The Wrong WeightsApproach
The modeling frameworks presented in Sections 2 and 3 are based on the notion of
limited comparability: under some conditions, consumers are unable to make a value
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comparison between market alternatives, and respond by choosing arbitrarily or by
default. In this section, I briey discuss a line of research that shares with the frame-
work of Section 3 the idea of obfuscation as lopsided location in multi-attribute space.
However, it does not share the limited-comparability aspect; instead, it assumes that
consumers are always able to make a comparison using a linear utility function, ex-
cept that the modeler judges the weights they apply to various product dimensions to
be wrong. The wrong weights may be due to an inherent bias or the rmsframing
devices. Most of the literature in the wrong weightscategory focuses on monopoly
pricing. In this section I describe a few works that applied the approach to competitive
market models.
The dividing line between the two classes of models is somewhat blurred - some
versions of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Bachi and Spiegler (2015) t both. Other
models examine choice procedures that mix ordinal and cardinal elements. Bachi (2015)
studies unidimensional competition when consumers cannot perceive small di¤erences.
Papi (2014) studies multi-dimensional competition when consumers can perform trade-
o¤s over a restricted number of dimensions, and rms use marketing to inuence the
set of dimensions they focus on.
5.1 Non-Linear Pricing under Biased Beliefs
Recall that one of the interpretations of the multi-attribute model is that each dimen-
sion corresponds to a contingency. The contingency can be a state that determines
the consumers willingness to pay for the rms product. This suggests the following
two-period variant on the multi-attribute model. In period 1, each rm o¤ers a price
plan t : R+ ! R, where t(x) is the total payment if the consumer chooses consumption
quantity x. The consumer then decides whether to choose one of the o¤ered contracts
or opt out. In period 2, having selected one of the contracts, the consumer is obliged by
it and proceeds to select a quantity x that carries the payment t(x). The consumers
outside option gives him a xed payo¤ normalized to 0. His utility from second-period
consumption is quasi-linear, u(x)  t(x), where u is an increasing function. However,
 may be random, and consumers have idiosyncratic prior beliefs regarding , which
potentially di¤er from the prior common to all rms.
The multiple dimensions in this model correspond to the consumers second-period
preference state. The rmsprior over these states is considered to be the correct,
unbiased belief, and the consumers prior applies incorrect weights to the states. For
instance, the consumer may systematically overestimate his future willingness to pay,
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such that his subjective prior over  rst-order-stochastically dominates the true dis-
tribution. Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) examine a two-state model of monopoly pricing
with this feature. Alternatively, the consumer may be overcondent in his beliefs,
in the sense that the true distribution over  second-order-stochastically dominates
the consumers prior. Grubb (2009) studies a many-states version of such a model.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) and numerous subse-
quent works, assumed that the consumers preferences are dynamically inconsistent -
i.e., he has a distinct rst-period preference over his second-period consumption. In
this context, an incorrect prior captures the consumers limited ability to anticipate
the change in his future preferences (his naivete, to use the literatures jargon). The
e¤ects I will highlight in this sub-section are independent of this added feature. I refer
the reader to Spiegler 2011 (ch. 2-5) and Grubb (2015b) for general reviews of pricing
models in which consumers have biased beliefs regarding their future preferences.
Complexity in this context can be viewed as an overlynon-linear price plan. For
instance, consider a two-state model with rational consumers and concave u, where
rms simultaneously commit to price plans in period 1. Then, rms choose linear,
marginal-cost pricing in symmetric Nash equilibrium. In contrast, when consumers
have biased prior beliefs, competition generates non-linear price plans that exploit the
di¤erence between consumers and rmsbeliefs. Specically, rms o¤er attractive,
loss-making prices for quantities that are expected in the state that the consumers
deem relatively more likely; rms compensate for this loss with high prices that generate
positive prots in the other state. This is analogous to the quasi-bait-and-switch tactics
we observed in the models of Section 3. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) derive such
a result in a model with two competing rms, where rms are restricted to use two-part
tari¤s and consumers have dynamically inconsistent preferences. Spiegler (2011, Ch.
2) lifts the restriction to two-part tari¤s and obtains a result in the same spirit.
What is the role of competition in generating this type of choice complexity? In par-
ticular, does competition reduce or rather increase the ubiquity of complex, non-linear
pricing? The following argument is made in Spiegler (2011, Ch. 4) in the context of
dynamically inconsistent preferences, but it is also applicable when the consumer does
not have a distinct rst-period preference over second-period consumption. Suppose
that the consumers rst-period prior belief is his private information. A monopolistic
rm o¤ers a menu of price plans in order to screen the consumers rst-period belief. As
usual in price-discrimination models, this may give rise to bunchingof similar con-
sumer types. In particular, consumers whose prior is relatively close to the rms belief
will be o¤ered the simple contract that the rm would o¤er to unbiased consumers.
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By contrast, in a competitive model where rms simultaneously commit to menus of
price plans, the split between consumers who choose simple and complex contracts is
determined by the zero-prot condition that all price plans satisfy in equilibrium, and
therefore it is insensitive to the distribution of consumersprior beliefs. Depending on
the shape of the distribution of consumer beliefs, it is possible that the switch from
monopoly to competition will raise the fraction of consumers who end up with a com-
plex, non-linear price plan. In this sense, competition can increase choice complexity
in this setting. Because complex contracts are more exploitative, the conclusion is that
competition may harm consumer welfare.
5.2 Endogenous Weights
Just as Heidhues et al. (2016) endogenized the existence of hidden attributes by the idea
of ex-ante exploitative innovation, we may ask whether consumerswrong weights
can be endogenized. Let us return to the static setting in which consumers make a
once-and-for-all decision, as in the models of Section 3. However, now assume that
the weights that consumers apply to di¤erent product dimensions are endogenously
a¤ected by the rmsmarketing strategies.
Spiegler (2014a) analyzes an example in which two rms simultaneously choose
elements in [0;1)K as well as an independent marketing message m. The latter is
a suggested vector of weights. The weights that the consumer ends up applying is
a simple average of the rmssuggestions. This simple model synthesizes modeling
ideas from Sections 2 and 3: on one hand, rmsbasic strategy is a location in multi-
dimensional space; yet on the other hand, rms also make use of an independent,
payo¤-irrelevant framing device. Symmetric Nash equilibria have a simple structure:
rms mix over quality vectors of the following form: qk = K for some k and qj = 0 for
all j 6= k, and thus earn zero prots. The quality vectors are maximally skewed subject
to the zero-prot condition. Firms accompany such vectors with a marketing message
that assigns all weight to the unique component k for which qk = K. Although both
rms suggest maximally skewed vectors of weights, they need not coordinate on the
same vector, and as a result the consumers weights need not be maximally skewed.
However, for any realization of the rmsequilibrium mixed strategy, the consumer
ends up assigning positive weight to two attributes at most. Thus, when K is large,
the consumers weights are close to being maximally skewed.
K½oszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013) construct
wrong-weights models of consumer choice in which weights are not determined by an
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independent framing variable, but by the very structure of the rms location in
multi-attribute space. More specically, the weight consumers apply to an attribute
increases with the variation of values it gets in the choice set. For instance, let n =
K = 2 and suppose that rms o¤er quality vectors that satisfy q11=q
1
2 > q
2
2=q
2
1 > 1.
That is, the product of each rm i is comparatively better along dimension k = i, yet
rm 1s advantage is greater in relative terms. The model of Bordalo et al. (2013)
implies that under such a strategy prole, the consumer will assign a larger weight
to dimension 1. In equilibrium, both rms choose q1 = q2 = 1 and earn zero prots.
This model of endogenous weights leads to a maximum simplicityselection among
all competitive market outcomes.
Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2014) analyze a sequential-move variant on this
model. In the rst stage, rms simultaneously commit to a value in one dimension,
interpreted as the product quality. In the second stage, having observed their quality
choices, they compete along the other dimension, interpreted as the product price. In
subgame prefect equilibrium, rms choose identical qualities and identical prices, and
earn zero prots. Thus, as in the simultaneous-move version, consumers apply correct
weights and there is no choice complexity along the equilibrium path. However, the
equilibrium provision of quality is lower than in the rational-consumer benchmark, be-
cause of the threat of out-of-equilibrium consumer bias resulting from a deviation. Un-
derprovision of quality becomes more pronounced as the consumers subjective weights
become more sensitive to rmsstrategy prole.
6 Conclusion
This article reviewed a number of modeling approaches to the question of choice com-
plexity and market competition. Choice complexity can be captured by an incomplete
comparability relation over the (labels of) available market alternatives, which is a
function of independent framingdevices; or it can be dened as lack of simple dom-
ination between multi-attribute market alternatives; or, relatedly, it can be described
by highly non-linear price plans. Despite their di¤erences, these modeling approaches
shared a common theme: in the simplest competitive-market environments, consumers
failure to make correct value comparisons is a force that impels rms to introduce choice
complexity, in an attempt to exploit consumersdecision errors and soften competi-
tive pressures. As we increase the competitiveness of the market (by switching from
monopoly to multi-rm settings, increasing the number of competitors, or introducing
an attractive outside option), rms tend to intensify their equilibrium attempts to in-
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crease complexity. As a result, greater competition is not unambiguously benecial for
consumers.
Throughout this review, I did not take a stand on whether complex alternatives
declare themselves as such. In some cases - e.g., when complexity is dened as jargon-
laden verbal descriptions - consumers can recognize which market alternatives are sim-
ple and which are complex. In other cases - recall the example of insurance companies
randomization over reimbursement levels - this distinction is hard to make. In yet other
cases - e.g., when choice complexity is due to incommensurable measurement units -
the distinction is nonsensical. However, when consumers can tell simple alternatives
from complex ones - even if they cannot evaluate them - they can follow a natural
heuristic: choose simple alternatives over complex ones. This heuristic clearly annuls
the forces that this review has emphasized, and pushes the market toward a competitive
outcome with simple contracts. See Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) for a formalization of
this argument.
The literature faces several interesting challenges. First, at the purely game-
theoretic level, we saw non-trivial classes of games that await complete equilibrium
characterization. Second, it would be interesting to nd properties of individual con-
sumer behavior like EC, which possesses similarly rich implications for market equilib-
rium. Third, my use of the notion of true utility throughout this review has been
quite vulgar from a revealed-preference point of view. It is imperative to strengthen
the link between the equilibrium market models and the decision-theoretic analysis of
consumer behavior. In particular, when we perform welfare analysis in market models,
the question is whether it can be grounded in actual or hypothetical consumer choices.
The question of welfare identication in the presence of bounded rationality has been
discussed in choice-theoretic settings (Berhneim and Rangel (2009), Rubinstein and
Salant (2012)), but market settings present interesting challenges in this regard (see
Eliaz and Spiegler (2015)).
Finally, although my orientation in this review has been purely theoretical, there
are beginnings of an empirical literature that addresses the interplay between complex-
ity and competitiveness. Some of these works use the experimental methodology (e.g.
Kalayci and Potters (2011), Crosetto and Gaudeul (2014), Huck, Lünser and Tyran
(2015), Kalayci (2015)), while others are in the empirical I.O.tradition (for discus-
sion of recent examples in Grubb (2015a)). The modeling frameworks introduced in
this review may be insightfully adapted for empirical work, as they suggest new un-
observables (the function  in Section 2, the parameter  in Section 4) that can help
making sense of data, and generate new predictions that link choice complexity and
32
more traditional market variables.
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